

Internal Security of India - Challenges and Softening Ways: An Analysis Since 2014

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Abstract

In the wake of several terrorist attack such as Mumbai blast, attack on parliament, 26/11 Mumbai attack, Naxal attacks in naxal affected areas indicated us that internal security are crucial for regional growth, prosperity, and national integration. Left Wing Extremism (LWE), internal terrorism, fundamentalist propaganda, and ethnic violence, which remain throughout since long time are seeking attention, and there is a need of comprehensive and effective solutions for such prevailing internal security threats. To invoke India's internal security architecture it is imperative to look after the policies of incumbent government and policymaker's proactive approach towards tackling various security challenges. Therefore this paper has carried out the quantitative analysis of government data. Further on the basis of analysis the paper has depicted the foundational pillars of security i.e deterrence, early warning, access control, and physical security. On the concluding note it has been estimated that India will be able to tackle effectively LWE by 2030.

Keywords: Left Wing Extremism, Internal Security, Ethnic violence, Policy, Government

I. Research Objectives

- (a) To analyse the internal security situation of India since 2014
- (b) To extract out the general pillars of security.

II. Introduction

It is the primary duty of the state to preserve its internal as well as external sovereign integrity and providing security to its territory and citizens. The two dimensional determining factor of an internal security policy consist a physical dimension determined by the military capabilities of the state to counter internal dissent and psychological dimension, which indicates the willingness of the people of the state to support the efforts of a government to achieve certain national interests (Arorra,

2007). As per the Indian Constitution (Art 355), “It shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that the government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.” Hence, responsibility of internal security lies with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in coordination with other state machinery. The MHA broadly classified the issue of internal security in the country as: (i) Terrorism in the hinterland of the country; (ii) Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in certain areas; (iii) Security situation in Jammu & Kashmir; and (iv) Insurgency in the North Eastern States. Apart from that, there are many other imminent threats to internal security where India needs to be tested very often. The main inclusions are disturbances during the general elections, the inexorable Kashmir conflict, the unresolved Naga Peace Accord, stress in financial institutions, bulging unemployed population, threat from cyber war, communal friction due to religious radicalisation, narco-terror nexus, attempt by inimical forces to revive militancy and insurgency in the Northeast, cross-border terrorism, and subversion of demography and democratic institutions. Amid these prevailing situations, the states are also dealing with the rising aspirations of the people of various ethnicities and regions. The problem is further compounded by the rapidly widening gap between the expectations and satisfaction levels of the people.

III. Research Methodology

The research paper has outlined terrorism, left wing extremism, and insurgency as a main contributor towards India’s internal security problems. The paper has been using quantitative data fetched from various annual reports published by Ministry of home affairs GOI, using 2014 as base year. Further, analysis has been made on the basis of data captured arranged in segregated tables and represented with the help of various graphs and figures. Microsoft Excel programme has been using for doing calculations (Eg. Averages, totals) and plotting graphs.

IV. India’s Internal Security Architecture

At the national level MHA is the nodal agency to look after all the matter to internal security through its various divisions. **Internal Security–I (IS-I) Division** deals with matters relating to internal security, law & order, Punjab; protection of human rights; national integration, communal harmony, Ayodhya, observance of National Unity Day; arms and explosives; security of persons and of vital installations; security clearances of projects and proposals; matters relating to BPR&D and establishment of National Police University. **Internal Security–II (IS-II) Division** deals with matters relating to extradition, mutual legal assistance, Interpole, Drug Law Enforcement & Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), the National Security Act and Central Scheme for Assistance to Civilian Victim/Families of Victims of Terrorist/Communal/LWE violence and cross border firing and Mine/IED blasts on Indian Territory. **Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) Division**, deal with the matter related to the J&K. **Left Wing Extremism (LWE) Division**, monitors the LWE situation and counter-measures being taken by the affected states with the objective of improving ground-level policing and development response as per the location specific action plans formulated / to be formulated by the affected States. **North East (NE) Division**, deals

with the internal security and law & order situation in the North-Eastern States, including matters relating to insurgency and talks with various extremist groups operating in that region. **National Investigation Agency (NIA)** was constituted under the NIA Act of 2008 as a special agency for investigation and prosecution of offences under the Acts specified in the Schedule of NIA Act. The NIA is a premier investigating agency at the Central level to investigate terrorism related cases including terrorism financing cases with its operational headquarters in New Delhi and branch offices in Hyderabad, Guwahati, Mumbai, Lucknow, Kochi, Kolkata, Jammu, and Raipur. **The Multi Agency Centre (MAC)** was created as a multi-agency intelligence coordination mechanism for counter terrorism with the mandate to share, collate, and disseminate terrorism related inputs on a day-to-day basis. The Subsidiary Multi Agency Centres (SMACs) were established in various states comprising representatives from various security agencies for streamlining intelligence efforts. The MAC has established connectivity between the National Capital, 25 Central Member Agencies and all the State Capitals. At present total of 429 SMAC Nodes and 251 District Police Offices are connected to the MAC/SMAC Network (Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report, 2018). **Combating Financing of Terrorism Cell (CFT Cell)**, deals with the policy matters on Combating Terrorist Financing (CFT) and Fake Indian Currency notes (FICN) under ministry of home affairs. Apart from it various central paramilitary forces (CPMFs) {Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), Assam Rifles, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Seema Surksha Bal (SSB) and the National Security Guard (NSG)}, Intelligence Bureau (IB) etc also help in strengthening of India's internal security.

V. Terrorism in Hinterland of the Country

Since independence India has been victimised of terrorism and insurgency internally as well as externally. Widely spread during 1980 in Jammu & Kashmir till its reach to the hinterland of the country cut a sorry figure to India's internal security doctrine. This new distinctive wave of terrorism targeted Indian cities with the political goal of discrediting India's economic growth by creating disorder. In 1993, a series of blasts in 13 places across Mumbai killed 257 people and injured 713. After a gap of nine years, in December 2002, a bomb blast in Mumbai's central station injured 25 people. In 2003, in three separate bomb blasts in Mumbai in January, March and August, 57 people were killed and 260 injured. In 2006, seven multiple bomb blasts on local trains in Mumbai killed 181 people. In November 2008, 166 people were killed in coordinated attacks by 10 men who came in via the sea from Pakistan (India Today, 2011). Again in July 2011, bomb blasts in Zaveri Bazar, Opera House and Dadar left 21 people dead and 113 injured, targeted attacks on India's defence installation clearly indicated that terrorism is not the peripheral phenomenon but it carefully spreading towards centre to promote disorder in Indian cities to project the image of instability and lawlessness to the outside world utilizing instant media and the internet (Goswami, 2013).


However, to understand the phenomenology of terrorism it may be noticed from different views by the various international organisations like The United States

Department of Defence (DoD) that defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” (Haziri and Bucaj, 2017). The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism to be “premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Haziri and Bucaj, 2017). India’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 define terrorist act (chapter 4, Art 15) as “Whoever does any act with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country...” (UAPA, 1967). According to various ministerial reports of government and international organisation like the UN, it can be reflected that for long time terrorism has been spreading in India by various non-state actors and terrorist outfit operated from outside as well as inside the country. Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and the Lashkar-e-Taiba raised between 1980s-1990s are the main organisation conducted terrorist raid in various parts of India. Furthermore, involvement of IM and SIMI like organisations in various unlawful activities indicated that such radical groups are itself formed internally on the basis of ideological psychosis and religious fundamentalism. Since the advent of militancy in J&K (in 1990), more than 14000 Civilians and 5000 Security Force (SF) personnel have lost their lives (Jacob and Naqshbandi, 2017). The trends of terrorist violence in J&K during the last one decade are shown in the table 1 and graph 1 given below:

Table 1: Terrorist Activities in Jammu and Kashmir Region

Year	Incidents	SFs killed	Civilians killed	Terrorists killed
2014	222	47	28	110
2015	208	39	17	108
2016	322	82	15	150
2017	342	80	40	213
2018	614	91	39	257
2019	594	80	39	157
2020	244	63	38	221
2021	229	42	41	180
2022	242	32	31	187
Total	3017	556	288	1583
Average	335	62	32	176

(Source: GOI MHA, Annual Reports 2019-20; 2021-22; 2022-23 / Authors compilation and computation)

Graph 1: Trends of Terrorist Violence**Figure 1: Government Data Projection of Terrorist Incidents**

MHA AR 2017-18		MHA AR 2018-19		MHA AR 2020-21		MHA AR 2021-22	
Year	Incidents	Year	Incidents	Year	Incidents	Year	Incidents
2013	170	2014	222	2014	222	2017	279
2014	222	2015	208	2015	208	2018	417
2015	208	2016	322	2016	322	2019	255
2016	322	2017	342	2017	342	2020	244
2017 (31.12.2017)	342	2018	614	2018	614	2021	229
		2019 (up to 31.03.2019)	116	2019	594		
						Year	Terrorist Initiated Incidents
							Encounters/Counter Terror operations
						2018	228
						2019	153
						2020	126
						2021	129
						2022	125

(Source: Source: GOI MHA, Annual Reports 2017-18; 2018-19; 2020-21; 2021-22; 2022-23)

It has been appeared that apart of taking various measure by the state and central government since 2014 there is an upward escalation in the terrorist activities and loss of life. Hence, there is a need to look in depth and try to establish cause for this surge. The incidental projection has showed that in the last one decade more than 3000 incidents were reported and on an average 335 incidents took place every year (see table 1). On the same note, more than 550 security force personnel and around 300 civilians were also killed in during these years. In the counter operations more than 1550 terrorists had been neutralised by security forces. The bell shape curve of incidents (see Graph 1) has showed that the prevalence nature of terrorist activities in the valley has been showing certainty and a degree of continuity in the end to end comparison. However, there has been a zigzag variation in counter killings of

terrorists, which shows that success rate of counter operations are inconsistency, hence it could be an indicator of poor intelligence gathering.

Moreover, after analysing MHA annual reports from 2017-18 to 2022-23, cases of data manipulation have been observed. For instance, number of incidents reported for the year 2018 in 2018-19 and 2020-21 report were 614, and same has been dropped to 417 incidents for 2018 in 2021-22 report (see Figure 1). Similarly, MHA reported 594 incidents for the year 2019 in his 2020-21 report and reduced to 255 incidents for 2019 in his 2021-22 annual report. Justification for the same has not been provided for such data manipulation. One of the probable reasons for this data manipulation could be to inlay the road for justification of abrogation of Art 370 in 2019.

Empirically, it has been appeared that merely escalation in no of security forces in the valley and shot down the more number of terrorist is not the solution of this programme. Just raising the battalion on the name of security is not enough. Multi prong strategy adopted by the state and central government bags mixed consequences in the recently pass various laws like abrogation of Art 370 and takeout the statehood and bifurcation of Jammu & Kashmir in two union territory. Lock down of the valley on the name of personnel safety act and preventative detention convert the heaven into solitary confinement. Short term effect of this will be radical element get a chance to propagate their anti-national agenda which in long run abrupt normalcy in the region. After abrogation of art 370 central government rally in different other part of country to tell the spread its political agenda to get the support of the people but it is noteworthy that not even a single mass rally has been organised in the state which can spread the word about its feasibility. This showed the lack of spirit of government to connect with the affected people of valley and establish the direct communication with the people. On the positive note successful holding elections for local government followed by parliamentary and legislative elections proved that democracy in the region has been strengthened.

VI. Left Wing Extremism (LWE)

The Naxal or Maoist conflict in India occurred in the 1967 as violent peasant protests in the Naxalbari district of West Bengal. It revived in the mid-1980s and is at present identified as the gravest internal security threat to India by top Indian policymakers. Naxalism has spread to 11 states in India, including Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, affecting nearly 90 districts. Why left wing extremism? Answering to that question it can be said that this violent programme has been flourished in the wake of illegal mining industry in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand which results in a lucrative source of earning for the Naxal leadership and cadres (Singh, 2012). Apart from that, it may also spread in the absence of political/executive administration due to which elite exploiter exploit the general mass population of this region and local leadership established to provide an alternate government to seek the development share of exploiter by means of the trigger of the guns and IED/RDX. Prime ministerial leadership of India declared LME a grave cause of concern (April 2006 speech, Manmohan Singh). The stated purpose of LWE is to establishing an alternative state structure in India by creating a “red corridor” in Naxalite-affected

states, stretching from the border of Nepal to central India to Karnataka in the south through violent struggle.

Naxalite movement in Indian adopted guerrilla warfare techniques inspired by the Mao Tse Tung. Terrain, communications, popular support, quality of cadres, base areas, technical aid, surprise attacks, and relative military capability of the opposing side are being used by the guerrilla militants against state forces (Griffith, 1961). Rationale behind such movement can be better understood by the fact that literacy rate in most of the affected areas is below 45 per cent, basic life supporting amenities is absent and lack of fundamental development opportunity, meagre resources for the living, lack of educational institute and mass poverty is prevalent in most of the affected areas. Emotional and social rallying point, use of media instrument has been used a platform for cadre recruitment. Local tax regime, illegal arms trades on international border, extra territorial training camp strengthening the cadre over a long a period of time (Singh, 2012).


Wide spread government intervention along with state governments to tackle this menace surely bring some success which can be visualised by government published report. Last few years have seen a significant decline in LWE violence as well as the geographical spread of LWE. “In 2022 the resultant deaths and casualties to Security Forces reduced by 33% (147 to 98) and by 68% (50to16) respectively in comparison to 2021” (MoHA, 2023). A comparative State-wise extent of LWE violence during 2014 to 2021 is reflecting below:

Table 2: State-wise data of LWE


States	2014		2015		2016		2017		2018		2019		2020		2021	
	I	D	I	D	I	D	I	D	I	D	I	D	I	D	I	D
A.P.	18	4	35	8	17	6	26	7	12	3	18	5	12	4	11	1
Bihar	163	32	110	17	129	28	99	22	59	15	62	17	26	8	26	7
CH	328	112	466	101	395	107	373	130	392	153	263	77	315	111	255	101
JH	384	103	310	56	323	85	251	56	205	43	200	54	199	39	130	26
M.P.	3	0	0	0	12	2	3	1	4	0	5	2	16	2	19	3
MH	70	28	55	18	73	23	69	16	75	12	66	34	30	8	31	6
Odisha	103	26	92	28	86	27	81	29	75	12	45	11	50	9	32	3
Tel	14	5	11	2	7	0	5	2	11	2	8	2	15	2	5	0
U.P.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W.B.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Others	8	0	10	0	6	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Total	1091	310	1089	230	1048	278	908	263	833	240	670	202	663	183	509	147
Total Incident	6811															
Total Deaths	2944															
*I-Incidents, D-Deaths, A.P.-Andhra Pradesh, CH-Chhattisgarh, JH-Jharkhand, M.P.-Madhya Pradesh, MH-Maharashtra Tel-Telangana , U.P.-Uttar Pradesh, W.B.-West Bengal																

(Source: GOI MHA, Annual Reports 2019-20; 2021-22; 2022-23 / Authors compilation and computation)


Graph 2: LWE: State-wise Incident Reported



Graph 3: LWE: State-wise Death Reported



Graph 3: LWE: Declining Trends



There has been an overall 53 per cent reduction in violent incidents (1091 to 509) and 53 per cent reduction (310 to 147) in LWE related deaths since end-2013. Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand have remained the worst hit states [See graph 2 & 3]. Chhattisgarh is accounted for 41 per cent of LWE incidents (2787 to 6811) followed by Jharkhand which accounted for 29 per cent of incident i.e. (2002 to 6811) [see table 2]. During LWE operations more than 70 per cent of security forces personnel alone have lost their life in these two states (2066 to 2944) [see table 2]. Nevertheless, LWE are on the declining trends since 2014 [see graph 3]. This performance has been achieved due to multi prongs strategy adopted by the Government of India. Specific Measures taken by the central government to combat Left Wing Extremism includes the Ban on CPI (Maoist); Strengthening the Intelligence Mechanism; Better Inter-State Coordination; Promulgation of SOP to tackling the Problem of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); 56 India Reserve (IR) Battalions were sanctioned to 10 LWE affected States of which 54 have been raised (MoHA, 2023). Various schemes launched by the MHA such as Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme, Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS) including Construction of 250 Fortified Police Stations in LWE Affected States, Civic Action Programme (CAP) for welfare activities in the LWE affected areas (Budget 20 crore); welfare activities in the LWE affected areas (Budget 1000 crore per year 2017-18 to 2019-20 and till now, 3295 crore have been released under the scheme); and Assistance to Central Agencies for LWE Management Scheme (ACALWEMS) (Budget 50 crore per annum from 2017-20 to 2019-20) (MoHA AR, 2017-18, 2018-19, 2019-20, 2021-22, 2022-23).

While addressing a press conference on LWE in Raipur on 24 August 2024, the Home Minister has said, “The fight against left-wing extremism is in its last phase... now is the time to strike the final blow against LWE with a strong strategy and ruthless approach. He said left-wing extremism will be completely eradicated in the country before March 2026” (Press Information Bureau, 2024). However, most of the actions taken indicating that self-centred action have been incorporated to boost the physical security. Mere issuing the Standard operating procedure cannot help the security forces to handle Improvised Explosive Device which is the main cause of casualties during convoy of forces. There is a time lag between budget announcing and budget sanctioning and further budget implementation. Marginal reduction in incident cannot be presumed to the elimination of threat. Threat is prevalent in more than 10 state and 90 district is indicated that lot need to be done on various front. Therefore, there is no silver bullet to tackle this problem and capabilities, capacities and a timely response are the key to neutralise threats and defeat the strategy of the adversaries (Kumar, 2019).

VII. Insurgency in the North Eastern States

Eight states of North East (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura) absorbing more than 200 ethnic groups which have distinct languages, dialects and sociocultural identities are comprising 8 per cent of the country's geographical area and about 4 per cent of the national population alongside sharing international border of 5484 kilometres {Bangladesh (1880 kms), Myanmar (1,643 kms), China (1,346 kms), Bhutan (516 kms) and Nepal


(99 kms)}(Arora, 2007). In and out spread of such regional diversity is full of insurgency, however showing reclining tendency over the last few years as per reports of Government of India.

Table 3: Status of Insurgency in the North Eastern States

Years	Incidents	Extremist arrested	Extremist Killed	Arms recovered/ surrendered	SFs Killed	Civilian Killed	Extremist surrendered	Persons kidnapped
2014	824	1934	181	1255	20	212	965	369
2015	574	1900	149	897	46	46	143	267
2016	484	1202	87	698	17	48	267	168
2017	308	995	57	432	12	37	130	102
2018	252	804	34	478	14	23	161	117
2019	223	936	12	379	04	21	158	108
2020	163	646	21	911	05	03	2696	69
2021	209	686	40	839	08	23	1473	94
2022	201	563	06	673	02	07	2023	103
Total	3238	9666	587	6562	128	420	8016	1397

(Source: GOI MHA, Annual Reports 2019-20; 2021-22; 2022-23)

Graph 3: Insurgency trends in the North- Eastern States of India



There are interethnic conflict and tension between Bodos, Kacharis and several other tribal groups in Assam. Meghalaya is having tensions between Garos and Khasis. Manipur has suffered with widespread violence and ethnicity between Meiteis and Kukis. Involvement of Nagas and Hmars ethnic groups are further complicating the issue of regional security in Manipur and adjacent states. In Mizoram, Chakmas and Mizos communities have experienced ethnic tension and conflict over indignity (Arora, 2007). Apart from that, tribal-nontribal conflicts and conflicts between hill tribes and plain tribes need to be looked after minutely to nurture united and internally safe, secure and strong India. The presence of several regional factions and ethnic groups caused nettle the peace in the North Eastern States. These includes militant activities of Naga insurgents from Nagaland-based UG factions of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) [(NSCN/Isak-Muviah, NSCN/Khaplang, NSCN/Reformation and NSCN/Neopao Konyak- Kitovi]; Active militant outfits of Assam - (ULFA-I), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Saoraigwra), (NDFB-S), United Liberation Front of Asom – (Independent); Insurgency ridden in Manipur affected by Meitei, Naga, Kuki, Zomi, Hmar and Muslim UG outfits; Garo militancy in Meghalaya; National Liberation Front of Tripura / Biswamohan (NLFT/B) and All Tripura Tiger Force(ATTF) insurgent outfit of Tripura.

Government action of talk and negotiation, surrender-cum-re-habitation scheme, vocational training, financial support who surrendered, declare organisation unlawful constitutionally, raising of reserved security battalion, peace talks accord are some steps taken by the administrative and executive authorities to mitigate such larger scale badly-behaved core issues of northeast insurgency. The multipronged approach adopted by government would lead to positive outcomes. Since 2014, there has been 75 per cent reduction in the incidents of insurgency (804 to 201) [see table 3]. On the same note, rate of surrendering extremist has also been raised significantly. While 965 extremist were surrendered in 2014, number goes to 2696 in 2020 and 2023 in 2022. There has been a rapid rise since 2020 and there successive years accounted for more than 77 per cent of total extremist surrendered during NDA government (see graph and table 3). Contrary to that, kidnapping of civilians is a worrisome act in the region. Since 2014, there have been 1397 cases of kidnapping registered till December 2022. Extremist have been using civilian as a negotiating entity with the security forces and state government for meeting their undue demands. Nevertheless, the reformist approaches also bring down the casualties at all fronts including killing of civilians and security forces (see graph 3). The downward trends at all fronts will definitely bring the positive outcome and India could eradicate the problem of insurgency in north-eastern states in the subsequent years and more precisely by 2030.

VIII. Extracted Pillars of Security

The paper from visualising the wide range internal security spectrum would suggest security pillars for any organisation, state or country. These pillars of security would act as guiding principles towards effective policy making to tackle menace of terrorism, insurgency and left wing extremism.

(1) Deterrence: It is a psychological phenomenon which creates the feeling of fear from doing something against the organisation in the heart and mind of anti- social

elements. In the wake of deterrence factor we pay importance on modernisation of police and security forces. Overall appearance of security personnel which includes their rig, weapon, training, physical outlook and gestures may create the deterrence factor which will be helpful for security related issue.

(2) Early warning: This security pillar may explain the robustness of early warning mechanism. In the light of this, many untoward misfortune attacks may be prevented. Accordingly, government need to spend more on more on local, state and national intelligence. Procuring of early warning radars, IFF system, setting up of listening post, mobile electro communication system. UAVs, installation of surface pickets, INTGRID platform, nonlinear junction diode etc are the some suggestive steps which may strengthen the internal security.

(3) Access Control: It may be considered as third pillar of security which talk about to keep the threat out of the reach as much as possible. To achieve this state need to identify VA&VPs (Vital Access and Vital Points) and largely to avoid unauthorised access. Some of the effective measure which could be adopted as strategic checks post, fortification of police stations, peripheral security by artificial intelligence, fencing, CCTV surveillance etc.

(4) Physical Security: When we fail to achieve the above three pillars of security fourth pillar i.e physical security would take place. It may be last step which may be used as the last resort to terminate the threat by physical engagement. The physical layer of security would lead to loss of life and material. Hence, states need to procure the advance weapons, blast proof vehicles, high grade bullet proof jackets, helmets, IED detectors and drones alongside training of security forces. Paramilitary forces would be deployed with Armed forces for cross training towards better planning and execution of counter operations.

IX. Suggested Recommendation

(1) Structural conditions and infrastructure improvement for the growth of Naxalism and north east areas such as paucity and livelihood issues must be resolute on a war footing by the state forces.

(2) Police reform and police adaptability regarding communication skills, intelligence gathering, culture of leadership, and infrastructure be improved.

(3) Processes of dialogue and negotiation with armed outfits must be conducted in a professional manner by people trained in negotiation techniques and not by generalized bureaucracy.

(4) India must ensure that countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar are not used by insurgent groups as launching pads for violence in its border states. Dialogue mechanism in all three countries need to be institutionalized and activated on a daily basis.

(5) Deterring terror would require focussed resource-rich responses in undoing the various links in the terror chain like finances, weapons networks, actors etc. Special Forces with focussed proficiency on pull apart terror finances, the networks, and the cells are a must. Since any act of terror is a process that starts much ahead of the actual strike, key intelligence on the process can only be tracked by personnel trained in counter-terrorism, which would avert attacks (Kumawat and Kaura, 2018).

(6) The state must also be well equipped to deal with the rising challenge of cyber-terrorism. Cyber specialization should be made a part of the counter-terror mechanism towards addressing hacking issues, tracing terror links in the virtual world, locating the computers etc.

X. Conclusion

Since 2014, Indian has made progress in all areas of internal security. Quantitative Analysis of data has shown that most of variables associated with the situation of internal security are showing the downward trends. Lot has been done and lot more need to be done. A regional fundamentalism and communally divide India on tenterhooks is a gift to our enemies. On these notes, this paper has attempted an analysis of security issues in a framework of internal terrorism, Left wing extremism and northeast insurgency in a broader prospect. It has been observed from various previous studies that, after every attack, the government makes lukewarm attempts to fit episodic responses into coherent frameworks for security-system reforms. Yet, any long-term strategic planning, which is key, remains absent. In India, ibid discussed problem cannot be understood in its real narrative, much less addressed as required, without comprehending the local and bygone context of the persistence of security defies. While highlighting the glimpse of security pillars this paper also give the 2030 projection of repercussion of internal threat scenario by showing the way head measure like more public spending, enhanced budget allocation, procrastination approach towards surrender and re-habitation approach. Training of police forces to came out as the core agenda while we tackling such threat against own people. People centric approach rather than self-interest need to be incorporated among the leadership handling such hot issues on behalf of the state. Bottom up approach rather than top down approach, need to be emphasised while making the policy for such affected areas. Ethnic and fundamentalism gap between the core and peripheral societies to be buttoned up by the economic, social, educational, political and secular equality.

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